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AFTERMARKET PURCHASER STANDING
UNDER § 11 OF THE SECURITIES ACT OF
1933
BRIAN MURRAY*
Following the collapse of the financial markets in the United
States in October 1929, Congress enacted the Securities Act of
1933 (the "1933 Act").' It was a cataclysmic change in the nature
of the securities markets. Before the 1933 Act an attitude and
legal climate of caveat emptor applied to purchasers of securities. 2 With its passage, Congress provided a remedy of strict liability against an issuer of public securities, which issued a materially false and misleading registration statement pursuant to
3
which its securities were sold to the public.

Although Congress would pass the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934, 4 which applies to any securities transaction, the focus of
the 1933 Act concerned the initial registrations of securities. 5 As
noted in the legislative history of the 1933 Act, billions of dollars
worth of securities were brought to market in the 1920s, over half

* B.A., University of Notre Dame, 1983; M.A., University of Notre Dame, 1986;

J.D., cum laude, St. John's University School of Law, 1990. Mr. Murray is a member
of Rabin &Peckel LLP, New York, New York.
1 15 U.S.C. § 77a (1994).
2 See Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 151 (1972) (noting
that prior to the 1933 Act there was a widespread attitude of caveat emptor); SEC v.
Capital Gains Research Bureau, 375 U.S. 180, 186 (1963) (stating that a fundamental purpose of the Securities Act of 1933 "was to substitute a philosophy of full disclosure for the philosophy of caveat emptor"); Silver v. New York Stock Exch., 373
U.S. 341, 351 (1963) (noting the need for higher ethical standards, imposed through
statute, after economic disasters in the 1920s).
3 See 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1994) (creating liability for misstatements or omissions on
a registration statement); Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723,
752 (1975) (stating the purpose of the 1933 Act was to regulate initial purchases).
4 15 U.S.C. § 78a (1994).
5 See 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a) (conditioning recovery on proof that security was acquired before an earning statement was issued or if after, only if purchaser was unaware of statement); see also Fischman v. Raytheon Mfg. Co., 188 F.2d 783, 786 (2d
Cir. 1951) (noting that the 1933 Act only applies to a limited group of plaintiffs who
purchased securities, which were the "direct subject" of the registration statement).
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of which had become completely worthless by 1933.6 In signing
the 1933 Act into law, President Franklin Delano Roosevelt
stated that Congress was putting "the burden of telling the whole
truth on the seller" in order to "give impetus to honest dealing in
securities and thereby bring back public confidence."7 In order to
put teeth into this idea, two civil liability provisions were built
into the 1933 Act, in the hope that this would facilitate the raising of capital by deserving companies.8
The first provision, § 11, provides for strict liability and
monetary damages for an issuer found to have sold securities
pursuant to a materially false or misleading registration statement, and lists four categories of other defendants who are also
liable. 9 Section 11 has no reliance requirement and no requirement that a plaintiff even prove damages; rather, a prima facie
case consists solely of proving a material misstatement10 or omission" in a registration statement or prospectus. 12 The burden of
disproving the elements of a § 11 case is on the defendants. As
part of their affirmative defenses they are allowed to prove that
6 See S. REP. No. 47, at 2 (1933) (recognizing that the United States lost approximately $25 billion dollars in one decade through the purchase and sale of
worthless securities); J. WILLIAM HICKS, CIVIL LIABILITIES: ENFORCEMENT AND
LITIGATION UNDER THE 1933 ACT § 4.01[1, at 4-6 (1996) (stating that one half of the
securities proved worthless because of lack of fair and honest dealing by dealers and
underwriters).
7 77 CONG. REC. 937 (1933).
8 See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 195 (1976) (noting the act was
meant to provide full disclosure which would help the market and raise ethical standards as well as capital); SEC v. Ralston Purina, Co., 346 U.S. 119, 125 (1953) (noting the act is to protect investors as well as the general public).
9 15 U.S.C. § 77k (noting that in addition to the issuer, or its director or partner,
every person who signed the statement, every underwriter, everyone who it named
in the statement, or those who gave authority to the statement may also be liable).
10A misstatement can be defined as a statement made on a registration that is
untrue or misleading, and would alter the decision of a reasonable person who read
them. See In re Trump Casino Sec. Litig., 7 F.3d 357, 368-69 (3d Cir. 1993); see also
TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438,449 (1976) ("An omitted fact is material if there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable shareholder would consider it important in deciding how to vote.").
11 An omission is a failure to perform a legally imposed obligation. See BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 1086 (6th ed. 1990).
12 See 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a) (stating that part of the registration statement must
contain an untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact); see
also Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 382 (1983) (explaining that a
plaintiff only needs to show a material misstatement or omission to establish a
prima facie case).
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the drop in the price of the stock was not caused by the mis13
statements or omissions, or that in the exercise of due diligence
they could not have known about the false statement or omission.1 4 The second provision, § 12, provides for a remedy of rescission against the seller of securities, sold pursuant to a materially false or misleading prospectus (and included in a
5
registration statement).'
In order to avail oneself of the protection of § 11 of the 1933
Act, a plaintiff must plead, and eventually prove, that the securities he or she purchased were issued pursuant to the defective
registration statement. 16 A purchaser who buys directly on an
initial public offering from an underwriter unquestionably has

13 Due diligence is defined as the "measure of prudence . . properly... expected
from, and ordinarily exercised by, a reasonable and prudent [person] under the particular circumstance." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 457 (6th ed. 1990); see also Ernst &
Ernst, 425 U.S. at 208 (noting due diligence is essentially a negligence standard);
Glassman v. Computervision Corp., 90 F.3d 617, 627 n.12 (1st Cir. 1996) ("Due diligence is equivalent to non-negligence."); In re Software Toolworks, Inc. Sec. Litig., 50
F.3d 615, 621 (9th Cir. 1994) (noting that the reasonable investigation test for due
diligence is almost identical to the reasonable care test used for negligence).
14 See 15 U.S.C. § 77k(b)(3) (stating that a person may be exempt from liability
upon proof that he or she had reasonable grounds to believe and did believe that the
statements were true and there was no omission to state a material fact). Only the
non-issuer defendants have the due diligence defense available to them. See id. Issuers' liability, however, is virtually absolute even for innocent mistakes. See In re Na-

tionsmart Corp. Sec. Litig., 130 F.3d 309, 315 (8th Cir. 1997); Herman & MacLean,
459 U.S. at 381-82.
15 See 15 U.S.C. § 77(l) (1994) (stating that a person may sue to recover the consideration paid for the security plus interest, less the amount of any income received); see also Jackson Tool & Die, Inc. v. Smith, 339 F.2d 88, 89 (5th Cir. 1964)
(explaining that plaintiff instituted suit under § 77(1)); Winter v. D.J.&M. Inv. &
Constr. Corp., 185 F. Supp. 943, 945 (S.D. Cal. 1960) (noting that the suit was
brought under the civil liabilities provisions of§ 77(1)).
16 See Shapiro v. UJB Fin. Corp., 964 F.2d 272, 286 (3d Cir. 1992) (stating plaintiffs must prove the purchase was pursuant to the registration statement); In re
ZZZZ Best Sec. Litig., No. CV-87-3574-RSWL(BX), 1994 WL 746649, at *3 (C.D. Cal.
Oct. 26, 1994) ("[A] plaintiff must prove that the shares purchased are traceable to
the offering covered by the offending registration statement"); In re AES Corp. Sec.
Litig., 825 F. Supp. 578, 592 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (noting a purchase pursuant to a defective registration statement cannot be a secondary purchase, but rather must be
traceable to the original statement); Lorber v. Beebe, 407 F. Supp. 279, 286
(S.D.N.Y. 1976) (noting that a plaintiff "must plead and prove that his stock was issued pursuant to the particular" defective statement). A defective registration
statement is a statement issued by a company seeking to have securities traded
publicly that is somehow lacking in a material aspect. See BLACIS LAW DICTIONARY
1284 (6th ed. 1990).
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standing to sue under § 11.17 Generally, courts have allowed aftermarket purchasers 8 who allege the securities they bought
were traceable to the registration statement at issue to have
standing to sue under § 11.19 If other securities of the same type
at issue in a case were traded prior to the issuance of the false or
misleading registration statement, tracing securities purchased
in the open market back to the registration statement is very difficult.20 Despite the widespread acceptance of tracing as a means

of establishing entitlement to the protection of § 11,21 the tracing
theory has been under attack since the Supreme Court's decision
in Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 22 a case involving § 12(2)23 of the 1933
Act. This article will discuss the continued viability of the tracing theory for a § 11 claim after the Gustafson opinion.

17 See Gould v. Harris, 929 F. Supp. 353, 359 (C.D. Cal. 1996) (noting that only
purchasers who purchased during an initial offering have standing); Kirkwood v.
Taylor, 590 F. Supp. 1375, 1378 (D. Minn. 1984) (noting purchasers must trace all
shares directly to the offering in order to have standing to sue). Although the
Kirkwood court referred to buying on the offering as "direct tracing," it is actually
not tracing at all. See id.
18 An aftermarket purchaser is one who purchases a security "after it has been
initially sold by the issuer through underwriters." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 61 (6th
ed. 1990).
19See In re College Bound Consol. Litig., No. 93 Civ. 2348 (MBM), 1994 WL
172408, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. May 4, 1994) (stating that plaintiff must trace stock back to
show it was purchased pursuant to statement); Abbey v. Computer Memories, Inc.,
634 F. Supp. 870, 872 (N.D. Cal. 1986) ("There is no dispute among the parties that
a plaintiff suing under section 11 must show that he or she purchased stock actually
issued in the offering for which the plaintiff claims there was a false or otherwise
misleading registration statement."); Unicorn Field, Inc. v. Cannon Group, Inc., 60
F.R.D. 217, 226 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) ("It is now well settled in this Circuit that § 11 of
the Securities Act... permits recovery only by purchasers of the shares covered by
the defective registration statement or by those who can trace their purchases directly to such shares.").
20 See Harden v. Raffensperger, Hughes & Co., 933 F. Supp. 763, 766-67 (S.D.
Ind. 1996) (noting the difficulties associated with tracing in the open market).
21 Tracing is the process by which plaintiffs demonstrate they purchased securities pursuant to the registration statement. See Kirkwood, 590 F. Supp. at 1377. The
Kirkwood court elaborated by discussing four possible tracing methods: direct, fungible mass, contrabroker, and heritage. See id. at 1377-83.
22 513 U.S. 561 (1995).
23 Section 12(2) is now codified in § 12(a)(2) of the Securities Act after an
amendment to the Securities Act in 1995. "Section 12(2)" and "Section 12(a)(2)" are
used interchangeably in this article.
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1. PRE-GUSTAFSON CASELAW CONCERNING THE TRACING THEORY
For the past thirty years, the law has been settled in the
Second Circuit, and most other jurisdictions, that purchasers in
the secondary market who can trace their stock back to an initial
public offering ("IPO") have standing to sue for violations under §
11.24 In Barnes v. Osofsky,2 the Second Circuit was faced with
the issue of whether a purchaser of stock who bought on the open
market and could not trace the stock back to an offering should
be entitled to damages even though purchasers who purchased
during the same time period, but could trace back, would be so
entitled. The plaintiffs in Barnes had purchased stock in the
open market, some of which was traceable to a registration
statement and some of which was not.26 Although they were participating in the recovery with regard to their purchases, which
were traceable to the registration statement, the district court
denied them recovery for those shares purchased in the open
27
market that were not traceable to the registration statement.
The plaintiffs made an equitable argument, stating that those
who could not trace their shares to the registration statement
suffered to the same extent as those who were able to trace
back.28 The Barnes court refused to extend § 11 to purchasers
who could not trace their stock to the defective registration
statement. 29 While the court acknowledged that an open market
purchaser's ability to trace back is an accident of fate resulting in

24 See, e.g., McFarland v. Memorex Corp., 493 F. Supp. 631, 641-42 (N.D. Cal.
1980) (denying plaintiff standing where plaintiff failed to trace stock to statement);
Lorber v. Beebe, 407 F. Supp. 279, 287 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (holding plaintiff must show
stock was actually issued pursuant to the challenged statement). With regard to
claims under § 12(2) of the 1933 Act, the law was unsettled prior to Gustafson. Compare Pacific Dunlop Holdings Inc. v. Allen & Co., 993 F.2d 578, 595 (7th Cir. 1993)
("Contrary to the Third Circuit, we hold that section 12(2) applies to initial offerings
and secondary market transactions.") with Ballay v. Legg Mason Wood Walker, Inc.,
925 F.2d 682, 689 (3d Cir. 1991) (stating that § 12(2) does not apply to aftermarket
trading). Given the limited holding of Gustafson, the law still is unsettled.
25 373 F.2d 269 (2d Cir. 1967).
2 See id. at 271 (limiting recovery to those who could establish they purchased
pursuant to the statement).
27 See id.
28 See id. at 271-72 (explaining the plaintiffs argument that a narrow construction offends the principle of equal treatment for people whose entitlement is not significantly different).

29 See id. at 273.
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unequal treatment under § 11, it nevertheless decided not to de30
part from the statutory scheme.
2. THE IMPORTANCE OF THE STANDING ISSUE

The question of who has standing to sue under § 11 has significant consequences in most securities class actions. In recent
years, if the price of an IPO rises immediately after the offering,
the initial purchasers often sell shares shortly after the offering.31 If standing is limited to purchasers who bought directly on
the initial public offering, an issuer's exposure in a suit under the
1933 Act can be greatly reduced.
The measure of damages under § 11 is the purchase price of
the stock (not to exceed the offering price), less the price of the
stock on the day the lawsuit is initiated.3 2 If the stock has been
sold prior to the initiation of the lawsuit, damages consist of the
difference between the purchase price (not to exceed the offering
price) and the sale price. 33 Thus, if the stock is sold at a profit,
the initial purchaser has no statutory damages. If a subsequent
purchaser, who sees the price of the stock drop below the offering
price upon disclosure of the previously undisclosed facts, cannot
trace his stock back to an underwriter in order to have standing,
there will be no statutory damages for that share.34
For instance, if stock is sold in an offering at $20 per share,
and the initial purchaser sells at $25, the initial purchaser will
have no statutory damages. The second purchaser of that share,
who buys stock at $25 and sells the stock at $10, will have lost
$15 on his trade. There will be statutory damages of $10 ($20 offering price minus $10 price when the suit is filed) provided the
second purchaser has standing. If the second purchaser has no
standing, the defendants have reduced damages by $10 per share
for each share the initial purchaser sold at a profit for the claims
under §11 of the 1933 Act. The second purchaser will still have a
30 See id.
31 See generally, Jonathan A. Shayne & Larry D. Soderquist, Inefficiency in the

Market for InitialPublic Offerings, 48 VAND. L. REV. 965 (1995).
32 See 15 U.S.C. § 77k(e) (1994) (indicating that a suit filed under this section
can recover the difference between these two prices).
33 See id. The damages are also limited if the stock is sold after the lawsuit is
filed, but prior to judgment. See id.
34 See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1998) (explaining the requirements for a cause of
action brought under § 10(b) of the 1934 Act).
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cause of action under § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934, but the burden will be on the plaintiff to prove both damages and the defendants' state of mind, whereas under § 11 the
burden is on the defendants to disprove those elements.3 5
Even if the stock price does not rise after the IPO, the damages will still be limited if only the initial purchaser has standing. If the stock is sold in the offering at $20, and sinks to $10
when the suit is started, statutory damages are presumed to be
$10 per share for the purchasers who have not sold their shares
prior to the commencement of the action. If the initial purchaser
sells at $15, the damages for that share will be only $5 ($20 purchase price minus $15 sale price) if only the initial purchaser has
standing. If subsequent purchasers are allowed to trace back to
the offering, the second purchaser will also have $5 in damages
($15 purchase price minus $10 when the suit is initiated). Thus,
total damages for that share will be $5 to the initial purchaser
and $5 to the second purchaser for a total of $10.
3. THE GUSTAFSON OPINION
Gustafson v. Alloyd Co. 36 involved neither an IPO nor the issue of standing of an aftermarket purchaser. Further, Gustafson
only involved a claim under §12(2) of the 1933 Act. In Gustafson,
Justice Kennedy, writing for a five justice majority, summarized
the issue in the opening lines of the opinion as follows:
Under § 12(2) of the Securities Act of 1933 buyers have an express cause of action for rescission against sellers who make
material misstatements or omissions "by means of a prospectus." The question presented is whether this right of rescission
extends to a private, secondary transaction, on the theory that
recitations in the purchase agreement are part of a "prospec37
tus."

Gustafson involved individuals who were the sole shareholders of a privately held corporation and who entered into a contract to sell their shares to another party.38 Rather than conducting a mid-year inventory of the company, the purchaser
relied on estimates, and included provisions in the contract of
35 See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1998); supra notes 10-13 and accompanying text.
36 513 U.S. 561 (1995).
37 Id. at 564.
38 See id.
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sale for adjustments after the closing if the estimates were inaccurate.39 The contract of sale was executed on December 20, 1989
and provided for a payment of $18,709,000 and an additional
payment of $2,122,219 to reflect the estimated increase in net
worth from the previous year.40 If the audit and financial statements for the year showed a variance between the estimated income and actual net earnings, the buyer could receive an adjustment.4 1 When the actual audited financial statements were
completed, they indicated that actual earnings were lower than
estimated earnings, therefore entitling the buyer to an adjustment of $815,000.42 The buyers rejected a tender of the $815,000
and instead sued under § 12(2) to rescind the contract of sale, arguing that the contract constituted a prospectus. 43 "The determinative question, then, is whether the contract between [the buyer
and seller] is a 'prospectus' as the term is used in the 1933 Act.""
Having thus phrased the question, Justice Kennedy embarked on an odyssey of statutory interpretation, beginning with
§ 10 of the Securities Act of 1933, 45 which sets forth what information must be contained in a prospectus.46 As there was "no
dispute that the contract in this case was not required to contain
the information contained in a registration statement and that
no statutory exception was required to take the document out of §
10's coverage,"4 7 Justice Kennedy found that the contract was not
a prospectus. He also found:
That does not mean that a document ceases to be a prospectus
whenever it omits a required piece of information. It does mean
that a document is not a prospectus within the meaning of that

39 See id. at 565.
40

See id.

41 See id.
42

See id.

43 See id at 565-66.

4Id. at 568. Justice Kennedy also described the question as "whether a prospectus is a document soliciting the public to purchase securities from the issuer."
Id. at 579.
45 15 U.S.C. § 77j (1994).

4See id. The Act requires that a prospectus contain the information found in
the registration statement. See id. In some situations, this information may be
summarized or omitted. See id.

47 Gustafson, 513 U.S. at 569.
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section if, absent an exemption, it need not comply with § 10's
requirements in the first place. 48
4. EARLY POST-GUSTAFSON DECISIONS
Gustafson only involved a claim under § 12(2), and the first
decisions after Gustafson that examined the standing issue only
involved claims under § 12(2). 49 These initial decisions held that
Gustafson precluded aftermarket purchasers from having
standing under § 12(2). For example, in Komanoff v. Mabon, Nugent & Co., 50 the court simply noted that in Gustafson the Supreme Court held, "Section 12(2) extends only to initial public offerings of stock, and not to secondary market transactions." 51
Soon thereafter, with little or no analysis, many courts began to
expand this premise to § 11.52 The first case to consider the issue
of aftermarket purchaser standing under § 11 after Gustafson
was Stack v. Lobo.53 The Stack court declared that "[in Gustafson, the Supreme Court held that § 12(2) applies only to initial

Id.
49 See, e.g., ESI Montgomery County, Inc. v. Montenay Intl Corp., 899 F. Supp.
48

1061, 1065 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (finding the plaintiffs could only have a § 12 claim if they
purchased in an IPO); Glamorgan Coal Corp. v. Ratner's Group PLC, No. 93 CIV.
7581 (RO), 1995 WL 406167, at *2-3 (S.D.N.Y. July 10, 1995) (discussing Gustafson
and liability under § 12); Komanoffv. Mabon, Nugent & Co., 884 F. Supp. 848, 857
(S.D.N.Y. 1995) (dismissing the §12 claims since the claims were related to secondary transactions and § 12 claims only extend to IPOs); In re Valence Tech. Sec.
Litig., No. C 94-1542-SC, 1995 WL 274343, at *17 (N.D. Cal. May 8, 1995) (focusing
on liability under § 12). Glamorganand the other § 12(2) decisions were later distinguished by a court which refused to apply Gustafson to § 11 because the Glamorgan
decision "is attributable not to the holding of Gustafson alone, but to the combination
of that holding with section 12's privity requirement." In re Fine Host Corp. Sec.
Litig., 25 F. Supp. 2d 61, 67 (D. Conn. 1998).
50 884 F. Supp. 848 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).
51 Id. at 857.

52 Not every court followed a broad interpretation. In In re U.S.A Classic Sec.
Litig., No. 93 Civ. 6667 (JSM), 1995 WL 363841, at *2-3 (S.D.N.Y. June 19, 1995),
the court did not apply the Gustafson analysis to the § 11 claim, even though it did
so for the § 12(2) claim. Likewise in Lilley v. Charren, 936 F. Supp. 708, 715 (N.D.
Cal. 1996), the court did not discuss Gustafson's applicability, even though it was
decided a year earlier, and simply stated that a plaintiff would have standing if he
can trace his purchase to a public offering. See Schoenhaut v. American Sensors,
Inc., 986 F. Supp. 785, 789-90 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (holding that tracing is viable to confer standing for § 11 and § 12(2) without mentioning the decision in Gustafson).
53 903 F. Supp. 1361 (N.D. Cal. 1995).
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distributions of securities in public offerings," 54 a statement

which is hard to reconcile with the text of Gustafson. The Stack
court then noted that Gustafson applied equally to § 11 and concluded that this precluded aftermarket transactions from the
scope of § 11.55 Stack did not consider the statutory language of §
11 in reaching its decision.
The opinion following Stack was Gannon v. Continental Insurance Co.,56 which noted that the prevailing law in the Third
Circuit was Ballay.5 7 Similar to Stack, the Gannon court interpreted Gustafson to apply only to IPOs.58 Two months later, the

same conclusion was reached in Gould v. Harris.59 In reaching
its conclusion, the Gould court simply noted that § 11 and § 12(2)
share the same legislative history.60
The first decision to recognize that Gustafson's holding actually involved the issue of what constitutes a prospectus, and not
whether aftermarket purchasers have standing, was Murphy v.
Hollywood Entertainment Corp.61 In Murphy, the court noted
54 Id.
at 1375. The court also relied on the dissenting opinion of Justice Ginsburg to support its conclusion. Despite the fact that the majority stated "this Court
concludes that § 11 is not applicable to aflermarket transactions," it earlier stated
that claims may be brought under § 11 "by those whose securities are traceable to
the public offering," and notes that the complaint does not allege the shares at issue
were traceable to the IPO. Id. at 1375, 1376. As a result, Stack is cited by courts for
the proposition that aftermarket purchasers have no standing. See Adair v. Bristol
Tech. Sys., Inc., 179 F.R.D. 126, 131 (S.D.N.Y. 1998); In re Valence Tech. Sec. Litig.,
No. C 95-20459 JW, 1996 WL 37788, at * 4 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 23, 1996). Courts also refer to the case for the related proposition that those who can trace their purchase to
the IPO may have standing. See Van de Walle v. Salomon Bros., Inc., No. 9894, 1997
WL 633288, at *4 n.26 (Del. Ch. Oct. 2, 1997) (noting that Stack indicated purchasers who could trace their purchase to a public offering would have standing under §
11 and § 12, but also noting that Stack relied on a pre-Gustafson case for that proposition); Murphy v. Hollywood Entertainment, Corp., No. CIV. 95-1926-MA, 1996 WL
393662, at *3 (D. Or. May 9, 1996) (noting that Stack found purchasers lacked
standing because they failed to allege their purchases were traceable to the IPO).
55 See Stack, 903 F. Supp. at 1375 (noting that Gustafson applies equally to § 11
because § 11 and § 12 share the same legislative history and several cases before
Gustafson also claimed that § 11 only applied to IPOs).
56 920 F. Supp. 566 (D.N.J. 1996).
567
See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
58 See Gannon, 920 F. Supp. at 575.
59 929 F. Supp. 353, 358 (C.D. Cal. 1996).
50 See id. at 358 (following the reasoning in Stack); see also Rhodes v. Omega
Research, Inc., 38 F. Supp.2d 1353, 1365 (S.D. Fla. 1999) (holding that Gould would
prelude a claim under § 11 and § 12(a)(2) because of the failure to assert the shares
were purchased in a public offering).
61 No. CIV. 95-1926-MA, 1996 WL 393662 (D. Or. May 9, 1996).
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that Gustafson's "holding was premised upon a public/private
distinction rather than the question presented here of the coverage of [§] 12(2) for sales direct from an offering versus aftermarket transaction."62 Relying in part on Stack, the court ultimately
decided to limit § 11 standing to purchasers directly on the offering. 63 The court seemed torn, however, and noted that
it was
64
decision."
any
of
dicta
the
into
much
too
read
to
"hesitant
The court in In re WRT Energy SecuritiesLitigation reached
a similar decision. 65 The court in WRT Energy held that "the
standing principles the Supreme Court announced in Gustafson
apply equally to section 11 claims."66 It also noted, as did Stack
and Gould, that § 11 and §12(2) share the same legislative history.67 Interestingly, none of these decisions examined the express language of § 11 when deciding whether that section extended to aftermarket purchasers, despite the principle that a
court should construe a statute by its express language. 68
5. THE RECENT TREND IS TO PERMIT TRACING
The trend of recent holdings is that tracing is still viable to
69
confer standing under § 11, even after the Gustafson opinion.
62

Id. at *3.

63

See id. at *3-4 (agreeing with the other courts which based their decisions on

the broad discussion of the 1933 Act by the Supreme Court in Gustafson).
64 Id. at *3.
65 No. 96 CIV. 3610, 96 CIV. 3611, 1997 WL 576023 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 15, 1997).
66 Id. at *6. The irony is that no standing principles were announced in Gustafson, it was merely an opinion about what constituted a prospectus. See supra notes
36-48 and accompanying text.
67 See id. (quoting HR REP. NO. 73-85, at 5 (1933)) (noting that "the 1933 Act
governs only new offerings' rather than 'the ordinary redistribution[s] of securities' ").
0 The analyses focused on case law interpreting the statute rather than the actual words of the statute. But, as the Supreme Court has noted, " '[t]he starting
point in every case involving construction of a statute is the language itself.' "
Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 471 U.S. 681, 685 (1985) (Powell, J., concurring)
(quoting Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 756 (1975)). Blue
Chip Stamps was a statutory interpretation case concerning securities under the
1934 Act.
69 See Hertzberg v. Dignity Partners, Inc., No. 98-16394, 1999 WL 651947, at *56 (9th Cir. Aug. 27 1999) (stating that the Gustafon decision has not caused any circuit to reconsider their views concerning standing); Feiner v. SS&C Tech., Inc., No.
Civ.A.3:97-CV656, 1999 WL 269103, at *1 (D. Conn. Mar. 23, 1999) (certifying a
class action that included aftermarket purchasers provided that the purchasers can
be traced to the offering); Adair v. Bristol Tech. Sys., Inc., 179 F.R.D. 126, 130-33
(S.D.N.Y. 1998) (holding that aftermarket purchasers have standing to sue if the
purchased securities are traceable to the registration in question); Schwartz v. Ce-
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The trend began with some courts holding that tracing an aftermarket purchase to an IPO was still valid to confer standing, but
the initial cases offered little or no analysis. 70 The most recent
decisions have an expansive analysis. The first such case was
Schwartz v. CelestialSeasonings,Inc.,71 in which the court agreed
with the plaintiffs that Gustafson "did not address, in dicta or
otherwise, the scope of § Il's pronouncement that 'any person acquiring such security' may bring a § 11 claim."72 The Celestial
Seasonings court examined the express statutory language of §
11, as well as the legislative history, and held that "notwithstanding Gustafson,.

.

. § 11 extends not only to persons who buy

'in the Offering,' but to all persons who acquired stock traceable
to a public offering conducted via a [false and] misleading registration statement. 73 The court distinguished the earlier cases
lestial Seasonings, Inc., 178 F.R.D. 545, 556 (D. Colo. 1998) (holding that §11 "extended to all persons who acquired stock traceable to a public offering conducted via
a misleading registration statement"); In re Fine Host Corp. Sec. Litig., 25 F. Supp.
2d 61, 67 (D. Conn. 1998) (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1999)) (contrasting the limiting
language of§ 12, limiting liability to purchasers of IPOs to the expansive recovery of
§ 11, allowing for recovery by "any person acquiring such security"); In re Websecure,
Inc. Sec. Litig., 182 F.R.D. 364, 368 (D. Mass. 1998) (stating that securities purchases traceable to an offering confer standing); Cooperman v. Individual, Inc., No.
Civ.A. 96-12272, 1998 WL 953726, at *4 (D. Mass. May 27, 1998) (noting that § 11
"imposes ... continuing liability for misstatements or material omissions in registration statements," thus standing is not limited to initial purchasers, but extends to
subsequent purchasers of securities traceable to the relevant registration statement), affd, 171 F.3d 43 (1st Cir. 1999); In re Stratosphere Corp. Sec. Litig., 1 F.
Supp. 2d. 1096, 1119 (D. Nev. 1998) (conferring standing on purchasers of securities
traceable to a public offering, not just direct purchasers). But see In re Paracelsus
Corp., Sec. Litig., 6 F. Supp. 2d 626, 631 (S.D. Tex. 1998) (dismissing plaintiffs § 11
claims relating to certain securities because they failed to allege a purchase of a security pursuant to an offering statement). The limited scholarly literature available
also supports such a construction of § 11. See Vincent R. Cappucci, Misreading
'Gustafson' Could EliminateLiability Under§ 11, N.Y. L.J., Sept. 22, 1997, at 1 (contending that the legislative history of § 11 and the statutory language support
standing for aftermarket purchasers).
70 See In re Stratosphere Corp. Sec. Litig., 1 F. Supp. 2d at 1119 ("[Tjhis Court
disagrees with the Gould court, which found that the dicta in Gustafson ... eliminated the well established rule of allowing Plaintiffs to pursue their
claims if their purchases can be 'traced' to the offering at issue.") (citation omitted);
In re Paracelsus Corp., Sec. Litig., 6 F. Supp. 2d at 631-32 (holding that until an appellate court holds otherwise, pleadings will be sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss if they allege that shares were purchased pursuant to a prospectus, even after
Gustafson).
71 178 F.R.D. at 545.
72 Id. at 555.
73 Id. at 556.
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limiting § 11 to direct purchasers on the IPO by noting that none
74
of them examined the text of § 11.
The next decision was from the Southern District of New
York in Adair v. Bristol Technology Systems, Inc.75 In Adair, the

court explicitly disagreed with the holding of WRT Energy7 6 and
instead followed the holding of Celestial Seasonings. Noting that
Gustafson did not involve a § 11 claim or an IPO, Judge Sweet
stated that the issue before the Gustafson Court was whether a
private agreement to sell constituted a prospectus for purposes of
§ 12(2) of the 1933 Act.77 Judge Sweet noted that the legislative
history was ambiguous with regard to § l's application to aftermarket purchasers and stated that "[iut does not affect the ordinary redistribution of securities." He further noted that "[section] 11 remedies are available 'regardless of whether [plaintiffs]
bought their securities at the time of the offer or at some later
date.' -78
See id. at 557.
179 F.R.D. 126 (S.D.N.Y. 1998).
Interestingly, an opinion issued after Adair, In re Summit Medical Sys., Inc.,
10 F. Supp. 2d 1068, 1070 (D. Minn. 1998), follows the holding of WRT Energy, and
like WRT Energy, contains no discussion of the express statutory language of § 11,
while deciding Gustafson precludes aftermarket purchasers from suing under § 11.
The same conclusion was reached in Warden v. Crown Am. Realty Trust, No. Civ. A.
96-25J, 1998 WL 725946, at *2 (W.D. Pa. Oct. 15, 1998). In Warden, the original
plaintiffs made a "half-hearted" argument in favor of standing. See id. The proposed
intervenor, who apparently made a more spirited attempt, still failed to cite the
relevant case law in his favor. See id. at *3, n.1. The Warden court, like Summit, did
not consider the statutory language of § 11, and appears to have misread Shapiro v.
UJB Fin. Corp., 964 F.2d 272 (3d Cir. 1992), which clearly states that alleging
"traceability" is sufficient at the pleading stage. See id. at 286. Summit and Warden
are the only decisions issued in 1998 to limit § 11 standing to purchasers directly on
the offering. See Summit, 10. F. Supp. 2d at 1070 (holding that "[s]ection 11 is applicable only to shareholders who acquired their stock in the IPO"); Warden, 1998 WL
726946, at *3 (rejecting the contention that "the nominal plaintiffs need not have
purchased shares in the... IPO").
77 See 179 F.R.D. at 131.
78 Id. at 132 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 73-85, at 5 (1933). The latter legislative history cited by Judge Sweet states, in relevant part:
Inasmuch as the value of a security may be affected by the information
given in the registration statement, irrespective of whether a particular
sale takes place in interstate or intrastate commerce, the civil remedies ac74
75
76

corded by this subsection against those responsible for a false or misleading
registration statement filed with the Federal Trade Commission are given
to all purchasers regardless of whether they bought their securities in an
interstate or intrastate transaction and regardless of whether they bought
their securities at the time of the original offer or at some later date, pro-
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Judge Sweet examined the express statutory language of §
1179 and found that the Barnes case was still good law and after-

market purchasers do have standing.8 0 The Adair court noted
that "the language of § 11 is broad: 'Any person acquiring such
security... may.. sue.' "81 In addition the court noted that:
[Section) 11(a) states that if a 'person acquired the security after
the issuer has made generally available to its security holders
an earnings statement covering a period of at least twelve
months beginning after the effective date of the registration
statement,' then the right of recovery is conditioned upon proof
that the person actually relied on the false statement in the
82
registration statement.
Such a purchaser by definition must have purchased in the af83
termarket.
In addition, Judge Sweet examined another provision of § 11
that seems to mandate the standing of aftermarket purchasers.
Section 11(e) allows purchasers to recover for "'such damages as
shall represent the difference between the amount paid for the

vided, of course, that the remedy is prosecuted within the period of limitations provided by section 13.
H. R. REP. No. 85, at 22 (1933). In 1933, registration statements were filed with the
FTC because the SEC was not created until the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 was
passed. See Dow Jones & Co. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 41 T.C. 102, 111
(1963).
79 See supra note 68 (noting that an analysis of a statute should begin with the
express language of the statute).
80 See Adair, 179 F.R.D. at 130-33 (referring to the thirty year history in the
Second Circuit of allowing standing based on purchases traceable to relevant registration documents). Another court in the Second Circuit recently reached the same
conclusion. In In re Fine Host Corp. Sec. Litig., 25 F. Supp. 2d 61, 66-67 (D. Conn.
1998), the court held that "[tihe holding of Gustafson in no way compels a result different from that reached in Barnes."
81Adair, 179 F.R.D. at 132. The Fine Host court compared the express language
of §§ 11 and 12, noting that § 11 states "any person" may sue, whereas § 12 "expressly limits recovery to only those purchasers who purchase their shares directly
from a seller who makes use of a false or misleading prospectus." In re Fine Host
Corp. Sec. Litig., 25 F. Supp. 2d at 67.
82 Adair, 179 F.R.D. at 132.
83 See id. (concluding that "Congress therefore explicitly contemplated that a
plaintiff could purchase a registered security well after the IPO and still have a
remedy under § 11"). A court in Massachusetts adopted the Adair analysis. See In re
Websecure, Inc. Sec. Litig., 182 F.R.D. 364 (D. Mass. 1998). In Websecure, the court
stated it "agree[d] with the Adair analysis and with its conclusions" and held a
plaintiff may plead a purchase in the IPO or a purchase traceable to the IPO to have
standing. Id. at 368.
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security (not exceeding the price at which the security was offered
to the public)'" and the lesser of either the value when the suit
was filed or the price at which the security was sold, if sold before
judgment. 84 This clause has meaning only if it applies to secondary market transactions. 85 Judge Sweet thus concluded that afto pursue claims under
termarket purchasers still have standing
86
§ 11 of the 1933 Act after Gustafson.
An opinion issued two weeks after Adair has an expansive
analysis of why Gustafson does not preclude purchasers from
suing under § 11. In Cooperman v. Individual, Inc.,87 the court
stated that "Gustafson was a decision not on standing, but rather
on the substantive elements of a § 12(2) action."8 8 The court further stated that "[in other words, the [Gustafson] Court held
that there is no right of recovery for misrepresentations in the aftermarket, but it did not preclude an aftermarket purchaser from
recovering for misrepresentations in an IPO."89 This observation
helps reconcile opinions like Stack with both Gustafson and
Adair. By limiting Gustafson to its facts, it simply states that
the provisions of § 12(2) are only implicated when a prospectus is
issued within the meaning of the Securities Act.
The Gustafson opinion says exactly this: "[ilt is not plausible
to infer that Congress created this extensive liability for every
casual communication between buyer and seller in the secondary
market."9 0 The liability stems from a misstatement in a prospectus. Once a prospectus is issued, however, any stock issued pursuant to that prospectus which is purchased either on the offering or in the aftermarket, will be afforded the protections of the
Securities Act. Purchasers in the aftermarket will therefore have
standing if they can show their stock is traceable to the offering.

84

Adair, 179 F.R.D. at 133 (citation omitted).

85 All initial purchasers of an IPO acquire the security at the offering price.

Thus, the statute's reference to purchases other than at the offering price can only
be interpreted as allowing standing for aftermarket purchasers.
86 See Adair, 179 F.R.D. at'133; see also In re Fine Host Corp. Sec. Litig., 25 F.
Supp. 2d at 67 ("Gustafsontherefore does not overrule Barnes, either directly or by
necessary implication.").
87 No. Civ.A. 96-12272, 1998 WL 953726, at *6 (D. Mass. May 27, 1998), affd on
othergrounds, 171 F.3d 43 (1st Cir. 1999).
88Id. at *6.
89 Id.

90 Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U.S. 561, 578 (1995).
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6. PROSPECTUS DELIVERY REQUIREMENTS OF § 4(3)(B)
In addition to the express statutory language of § 11, there is
another section of the 1933 Act that confers standing to sue on at
least some aftermarket purchasers. Section 4(3)(B) of the 1933
Act requires that a prospectus be delivered within 90 days of an
initial public offering for each sale by a dealer of the securities
covered by the registration statement. 91 Any securities sold by an
underwriter as part of its initial allotment of securities must be
accompanied by a prospectus. Subsequent sales of a security
covered by the registration statement of an underwriter who has
sold out its initial allotment, however, must still be accompanied
by a prospectus, if the sale is within the 90 day window. 92 Dealers who were not underwriters of the offering must also provide a
prospectus with all sales during the 90 day window.9 3 The SEC
has promulgated a rule that shortens the 90 day prospectus delivery requirement to 25 days if the stock is already listed for
trading on a national exchange on the date of the offering. 94
Under § 4(3)(B), therefore, all purchasers of a stock issued in
an initial public offering should receive a prospectus in connection with their purchase as long as the purchase occurs within
91 The ninety day requirement applies to issuers who have not registered securities previously. See 15 U.S.C. § 77d(3)(C) (1994). Issuers with prior registrations are
subject to a forty day prospectus delivery requirement. See 15 U.S.C. § 77d(3)(B)
(1994).
92 See Levitin v. A Pea in the Pod, Inc., No. 3:94-CV-0247, 1997 WL 160184, at
*3 (N.D. Tex. March 31, 1997) (noting the 90 day prospectus delivery requirement of
IPOs); 17 C.F.R. § 230.174 (1999) (limiting period to 25 days for issuers listed on national securities exchanges or NASDAQ); Stack v. Lobo, 903 F. Supp. 1361, 1375
(N.D. Cal. 1995) (noting the 25 day prospectus delivery requirement for listed securities).
93 See 17 C.F.R. § 230.174.
94 See 17 C.F.R. § 230.174(d). This rule states:
If (1) the registration statement relates to the security of an issuer that is
not subject, immediately prior to the time of filing the registration statement, to the reporting requirements of section 13 or 15(d) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, and (2) as of the offering date, the security is listed
on a registered national securities exchange or authorized for inclusion in
an electronic inter-dealer quotation system sponsored and governed by the
rules of a registered securities association, no prospectus need be delivered
after the expiration of twenty-five calendar days after the offering date. For
purposes of this provision, the term offering date refers to the later of the
effective date of the registration statement or the first date on which the
security was bona fide offered to the public.
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25, 40, or 90 days of the offering, depending on the issuer's prior
registration status or listing on an exchange. Since sales within
the 25, 40, or 90 day window are accompanied by the delivery of a
prospectus, they would seem to be akin to sales directly on the offering.95 In Feiner v. SS&C Technologies Inc., 96 in the context of
examining the standing of aftermarket purchasers under § 12(2),
the court concluded that limiting standing to purchasers directly
on the offering would "eviscerate" the prospectus delivery requirements. The court held that all purchasers within 25 days of
the offering had standing to sue, provided they were in privity
with the defendant. 97 Another court has done this as well, holding that § 4(3)(B) "statutorily extends the period of an initial
public offering by ninety (90) days following the commencement
of the offering" and all purchasers in that period who received
prospectus "may therefore be considered to have purchased on
98
the initial public offering."
The Feiner and Wade cases were decided under § 12(2), but
given the applicability of § 4(3)(B) to both § 11 and § 12, there is
no reason to limit their application to § 12. Section 4(3)(B) would
seem to afford aftermarket purchasers (who receive a prospectus)
standing under both § 11 and § 12(2) for a minimum of 25 and a
maximum of 90 days after the offering.

95 See Levitin, 1997 WL 160184, at *3 ("Any redistribution of that stock within
the statutory period of time takes on the characteristics of a new offering."). The
court in Levitin noted that a purchaser within 25 days after an IPO has standing to
sue under § 12(2). See id.; see also Stack, 903 F. Supp. at 1375 (concluding plaintiffs
did not purchase within 25 days of the offering, so they had no standing); In re
Proxima Corp. Sec. Litig., No. 93-1139-IEG, 1994 WL 374306, at *10-11 (S.D. Cal.
May 3, 1994) (holding that open market purchases within 90 days of IPO retained
characteristics of new offering due to 4(3)(B) and plaintiffs who purchased within 90
day period could sue under § 12(2)). But see In re Valence Tech. Sec. Litig., C 9520459, 1996 WL 37788, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 23, 1996) ("[Section] 12(2) applies only
to a transaction which requires a prospectus to be delivered."); In re Media Vision
Tech, No. C-94-1015, 1995 WL 787549, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 23, 1995) ("It does not
appear to the Court that plaintiffs' analysis is correct [that § 4(3)(B) extends the period of an IPO 90 days].").
96 No. CIV.A.3:97-CV656, 1999 WL 269103, at *2 (D. Conn. Mar. 23, 1999).
97 Id. at *3.
98 Wade v. Industrial Funding Corp., No. C 92-0343, 1993 WL 650837, at *5
(N.D. Cal. Aug. 30, 1993) (dismissing claims for § 12(2) purchasers, except for purchasers in IPO or purchasers within 90 day delivery requirement window).
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CONCLUSION

Following an initial flurry of decisions after Gustafson which
limited standing under § 11 to purchasers on an IPO, the more
recent and more well-reasoned decisions allow aftermarket purchasers standing to sue under § 11. Such decisions are not only
consistent with both the explicit statutory language of § 11, and
to a limited extent with § 4(3)(B), but, are also truer to the legislative spirit behind the Securities Act in providing the broadest
possible protection to purchasers of initial public offerings.

